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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model where two competing ﬁrms need access to basic knowledge
that only one ﬁrm owns. We determine the impact of an imperfect property right on the
incentive to transfer that knowledge to the competitor. We compare three transfer strategies.
(i) patenting may lead to litigation costs that depend on the competition toughness. (ii)
keeping the knowledge secret involves no licence revenue but ensures a monopoly proﬁt. (iii)
The ﬁrm can also cooperate with the competitor and thereby avoids litigation. We show
that whenver competition between both ﬁrms is low, making patentable basic knowledge
promotes knowledge transfer through research cooperation.
∗GAEL, UMR INRA-Université Pierre Mendès France de Grenoble. E-mail: michel@inra.grenoble.fr and
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11 Introduction
One of the main objectives of a patent is to promote knowledge transfer. Yet, the patent may lead
to transaction costs that hinder the eﬃciency of knowledge transfer. Let us consider for instance
a typical example such as the one of Myriad Genetics. In 2001, the European Patent Oﬃce
(EPO) granted to this biotech ﬁrm a patent for the ﬁrst genetic test detecting predisposition
to breast cancer in which two genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, play a key role. The patent was
granted for any test implying one of these two genes. Myriad decided to use of that very broad
patent to preserve its monopoly position by denying any type of licence to competing tests. As
a response, competitors decided either to ignore Myriad’s patent or to launch an opposition
procedure (see Gold and Carbone, 2008). Eventually, in November 2008, Myriad won European
patent appeal but the scope of its patent has been drastically reduced since the revised patent
claims are no longer over both genes. In order to avoid the litigation costs and possible patent
scope reductions, Myriad could have decided, instead, to cooperate with other potential users
by giving them open access to the basic knowledge (namely the two genes) with a research cost
sharing agreement. For example, the Single Nucleotid Polymorphysm (SNP) consortium consists
for the members to ﬁnance over 300,000 human SNPs and to make them freely available after
obtaining provisional patents (Williamson, 2000) to avoid litigation.
Such examples lead some practitioners and researchers (Henry et al., 2003 or Roﬀe, 2007) to
conclude that a cooperative solution combines incentives to innovate with open access to basic
k n o w l e d g ea n dt h e r e f o r ei sm o r ee ﬃcient, from a social point of view, than a broad patent that
leads to costly access to knowledge due to high licence fees and litigation costs. As a result,
they recommend to prohibit patent for very basic innovations. However, in the absence of broad
patents, ﬁrms might keep their knowledge secret. Therefore, a broad patent may lead to better
(although costly) access to knowledge. Yet it might induce ﬁrms to cooperate less than in the
case where broad patents are not available. According to a study by Ménière et al. (2008)
based on 35 interviews with French public laboratories, this solution is increasingly frequent.
20 laboratories out of 35 have recourse to the secrecy to manage the conditions of access to
collections of genetic material and data basis.
We ask in this paper: does a broad patent deter ﬁrms to carry-out a cooperative solution
to transfer knowledge? Our objective is thus to examine, from a theoretical point of view, the
impact of patent prohibition for basic innovations on the incentive to cooperate to share basic
knowledge.
2Our main result shows that having the option to patent basic innovations is likely to promote
knowledge sharing through research cooperation.
Plant breeding is an appropriate example to illustrate the three main options a ﬁrm considers
regarding knowledge transfer.
Consider a new plant variety that entails a particular characteristic such as pathogen’s re-
sistance or gustatory quality. The access to the genetic marker of the sequence which codes the
innovating characteristic could lead a competitor to use that characteristic in a diﬀerent plant
variety. The initial innovator has three main options regarding the genetic marker. First, he
can keep it secret. Second, he can patent it with or without granting a licence to its competitor.
Third, the innovator can propose to the competitor to cooperate by sharing research cost with
open access to the genetic marker. We aim at determining the incentive to cooperate with the
competitor if the genetic marker is patentable.
Let us present our framework and the underlying mechanisms of our results. We consider
a ﬁrm, the "innovator", that owns a basic innovation. That ﬁrm as well as a "competitor"
could use the basic innovation to carry-out two diﬀerent applications. The innovator faces three
main options regarding the transfer of the basic innovation: patenting, research cooperation or
secrecy. We present brieﬂye a c hs o l u t i o n .
First, if the innovator patents the basic innovation, the induced knowledge disclosure allows
the competitor to develop its application. The innovator requires a licence from the competitor.
Nevertheless, the competitor can refuse the licence contract arguing that its innovation does
not infringe the patent due to substantial diﬀerences between the basic innovation and the
application. In this case, the innovator may sue the competitor. The outcome of the trial is
uncertain and depends among other elements on the characteristics of the application (Merges
and Nelson, 1994). We assume here that the probability for the patent holder to win the trial
does not depend on the quality of the patent. We focus only on the possible infringement
of the competitor’s application on the original patent. For this reason, we consider that the
patent holder is less informed than the competitor on the probability of actual infringement.
For instance, in the Myriad case, it was hard for Myriad to anticipate the eventual decision of
the European Patent Oﬃce that depended eventually, among other things, on the characteristics
of the alleged infringing innovation (Gold and Carbone, 2008). As a result of the information
asymmetry, the patentee and the competitor can fail to settle on a licence agreement. Therefore,
patenting involves possible litigation costs.
Second, the ﬁrm can propose research cooperation to the competitor. Research cooperation
3consists in sharing the basic innovation, so that both ﬁrms have open access to the basic inno-
vation, provided that the competitor accepts to pay a ﬁxed fee deﬁned by the innovator. Thus
the ﬁxed fee is an access price to the basic innovation. It worth noting that two main features
justify the term cooperation. First, the ﬁxed fee leads to cost sharing between both ﬁrms and
second both ﬁrms have open access to the basic innovation.
Third, the ﬁrm can keep the innovation secret and thus denies the access to the other
innovator. We consider here an extreme situation since we assume that in case of secrecy the
competitor cannot develop its own innovation. Therefore, if the ﬁrm keeps the basic innovation
secret, it enjoys monopoly power.
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rﬁrst result, in the absence of a patent for the basic innovation, if both
ﬁrms provide suﬃciently diﬀerent applications of the basic innovation, cooperation is the most
proﬁtable solution for the innovator since it allows the innovator to beneﬁtf r o mk n o w l e d g e
sharing through the access price required to the competitor. Put it diﬀerently, the ﬁrm prefers the
cooperative solution for low levels of competition on the market. For high level of competition,
the basic innovation is kept secret.
The introduction of possibility to patent basic innovations modiﬁes substantially this trade-
oﬀ between competition and the access price.
The patent accommodates competition through the royalty rate of the licence contract. Thus,
if the licence contract is accepted, the patent is the solution that leads to the highest level of total
proﬁtt ob es h a r e db e t w e e nb o t hﬁrms. Yet, licence refusal by the competitor triggers costly
litigation. We show that competition toughness plays a key role in the competitor’s decision
to refuse the licence contract. Indeed, if the competitor accepts the licence contract he must
pay the royalty rate as well as the ﬁxed fee. Nevertheless, the royalty rate softens competition
between both ﬁrms on the market for applications. If the competitor decides to refuse the licence
contract, at best he wins the trial and avoids any licence fee but faces tougher competition. We
deduce that the higher the competition on the market for application, the higher the opportunity
cost for the competitor to dispute the patent. Therefore, the beneﬁt of the patent increases with
competition.
Eventually, the innovator prefers research cooperation whenever competition is soft and
chooses the patent otherwise. Two main reasons explain that optimal choice according to the
level of competition. In case of tough competition, the competitor is willing to accept the licence
contract to avoid costly litigation and competition on the market implied by research cooperation
leads to low level of proﬁt. Instead, as far as competition is soft, the competitor is more reluctant
4to accept a licence and thus, the innovator is induced to prefer research cooperation to avoid
litigation and moreover soft competition does not reduce so much the proﬁto fb o t hﬁrms.
Nevertheless, cooperation is chosen against the patent for higher levels of competition than
against the secret.
More importantly, we show that the patent is not always preferred to the research cooperation
solution. Rather, the opportunity to patent the innovation is likely to foster cooperation. Indeed,
the possibility for the ﬁrm to patent the basic innovation increases the bargaining power when
it negotiates the access price in case of research cooperation. In ﬁne, the basic innovator could
prefer to cooperate rather than to ﬁle a patent in order to avoid costly litigation even for
competition levels where the secret was more proﬁtable than cooperation.
Here is our most important result. We stress that the introduction of the patent is likely
to encourage cooperation rather than to deter the cooperative solution to transfer knowledge.
Indeed, even if the broad patent is available, the ﬁrm may still prefer the cooperation in order
to avoid litigation costs. We usually oppose research cooperation and intellectual property right
such as the patent. Rather, we show here that both could complement each other. We stress
that the patent could facilitate open access to knowledge through the cooperation.
We can also interpret our cooperative solution as an "open licence", that is a licence that
makes available the knowledge under the payment of a lump-sum fee (generally free). Indeed,
most of the time, under the open licence, the licensor’s innovation remains patented in order
to restrict the open licence to speciﬁc uses of the innovation. For example, in the Eco-Patent
Commons initiative, IBM associated with Nokia, Sony and Pitney Bowes give open and free
access to a large number of innovations but for research and development in the ﬁeld of sus-
tainable development only. As an expert of the sector explains : “it is important to understand
that these groups do not give up these patents". In that way, if they assume that third parties
innovations competed with them on their own sector, they could always withdraw the licence.
This example illustrates our theoretical result where the patent complements the open access
granted to the innovation.
The related literature
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to analyze the trade-oﬀ between secrecy, cooperation
and the patent.
Nevertheless, a large literature studies the sole role of either the patent or research coopera-
tion on knowledge transfer between ﬁrms.
A stream of the literature examines the trade-oﬀ between patent and secrecy either between
5competitors (among others, Anton and Yao, 2004, Kultti and Takalo, 2005) or on a vertical
structure (Battacharya and Guriev, 2006). Our main contribution to this literature is the intro-
duction of research cooperation as a third alternative.
Other models focus (Green and Scotchmer, 1995 or d’Aspremont et al., 2000) on the optimal
way to induce knowledge transfer between two ﬁrms.
Green and Scotchmer (1995) examine the role of the patent breadth on the incentive to
innovate of an upstream innovator and an application (a downstream innovator). They argue
that as long as licences could be negotiated before research costs are incurred, the broad patent
granted to the basic innovation gives the right incentives to both innovators. Indeed, the broad
patent constrains the downstream innovator to negotiate a licence with the upstream innovator.
Moreover, since both innovators negotiate ex-ante, an agreement always exists. This is close to
our result on the complementarity between the broad patent and research cooperation but for
av e r yd i ﬀerent reason. Indeed, they assume a very strong patent so that the basic innovator
can always constrain the downstream innovator to negotiate a licence. Instead, in our model,
it is the presence of litigation costs that leads the upstream innovator to prefer the cooperative
solution. Thus, in brief, in Green and Scotchmer it is the very strong patent that induces both
ﬁrms to agree ex-ante whereas in our model it is the "weakness" of the patent that leads the
upstream innovator to share knowledge ex-ante.
d’Aspremont et al. (2000) study a licence contract between an "informed ﬁrm" that could
be induced to transfer knowledge to a competitor. They show that there exists an incentive
compatible and individually rational contract that leads to full disclosure. Unlike their model,
we consider two diﬀerent ways for ﬁrms to share knowledge: the patent associated with a licence
contract and "cooperation" which is a lump-sum monetary transfer that gives open access to
knowledge to the competitor. Moreover, in their paper, the cooperation or knowledge sharing
is always proﬁtable since it leads to a total proﬁt increase. Rather, our two solutions involve
private ineﬃciencies with respect to the maximized total proﬁt. We study the in that framework
the incentive to share knowledge as well as the most proﬁtable solution to do so.
In our model, the patent involves possible litigation costs because of both the probabilistic
nature of the patent and asymmetric information. The ﬁrst models that study the role of
probabilistic patents on litigation are Farrel and Shapiro (2008 and 2005) and Meurer (1994).
The patent part of our model is very close to Llobet (2003). Nevertheless, we introduce in
this type of model the cooperative solution as a competing solution for the innovator to sell
knowledge to a competitor.
62T h e m o d e l
We ﬁrst present the framework and then we give details on the timing of the game.
2.1 The framework
We consider two ﬁrms: an "upstream innovator", denoted by I, and a "downstream ﬁrm"
denoted by E. Firm I owns a basic innovation and can develop an application from that basic
innovation. The downstream ﬁrm does not know the basic innovation and thus is unable to
carry-out any application alone. Nevertheless, once the basic innovation is displayed, ﬁrm E is
able to develop its own application.
Both applications are imperfect substitutes. We denote by the parameter γ the toughness of
competition between both ﬁrms: the higher γ, the higher the competitive pressure. We develop
an Hotelling framework in the appendix where 1
γ is the degree of diﬀerentiation between both
applications. We assume that the downstream innovations (the applications) are patented.
The upstream innovator can adopt three basic strategies regarding the basic innovation. Let
us present brieﬂy these strategies.
Research cooperation
Firm I proposes to the downstream ﬁrm to share knowledge at price F. Once ﬁrm I proposes
to ﬁrm E to share knowledge, the ﬁrm reveals the existence of the basic innovation. If ﬁrm E
accepts, ﬁrm E has full access to the basic knowledge and thus develops its application with
probability 1. Both ﬁrms compete on the market for applications and thus the proﬁte a r n e db y
each one is a duopoly proﬁt denoted by πd(γ). We assume that the higher competition on the
market, the lower the proﬁt πd(γ). If ﬁrm E refuses the price F proposed by ﬁrm I,ﬁrm E is able
to develop the application with probability δ only (with δ ∈ [0,1]). Firm E earns an expected
proﬁte q u a lt oδπd(γ) and the expected proﬁto fﬁrm I is equal to δπd(γ)+(1−δ)πm(γ) where
πm(γ) is the monopoly proﬁte a r n e db yﬁrm I when ﬁrm E does not innovate. This strategy
is denominated as "cooperation" since both ﬁrms share the upstream innovation and the price
F leads to research cost sharing. We can also interpret this cooperative solution as an "open
licence". There are huge disparities in the open source world. Nevertheless, there are open
licences without any restriction in the use of knowledge. It is the case of the BSD licence. In
such a case the open licence amounts to a lump-sum payment for open access to knowledge.
The secrecy
The ﬁrm keeps its basic knowledge secret. In that case we assume full secrecy so that the
7downstream entrant has no access to the basic innovation and thus cannot develop its application
(it amounts to assume δ =0 ) .T h e r e f o r e ,I is the only ﬁrm to develop an application and thus
enjoys the monopoly proﬁt denoted by πm(γ).
The Patent
The upstream innovator patents the basic innovation. Knowledge disclosure allows the down-
stream ﬁrm to develop its own application (it amounts here to consider δ =1 ) . Nevertheless the
patent holder, ﬁrm I, can require a licence from ﬁrm E. The licence contract is a two-part tariﬀ
with a royalty rate, r, and a ﬁxed part P. If ﬁrm E accepts the licence contract, the proﬁto f
each ﬁrm depends on the royalty rate denoted by r. Hence the proﬁto fb o t hﬁrms: πI,d(r,γ)+P
for ﬁrm I and πE,d(r,γ) − P for ﬁrm E. There exists a royalty rate that maximizes the joint
proﬁt πI,d(r,γ)+πE,d(r,γ). We denote by r∗ such a royalty rate and the corresponding joint
proﬁti se q u a lt oΠ(γ).
The application of ﬁrm E is likely to infringe on the patent. The probability of infringe-
ment depends on the technical characteristics of the application. The higher the technological
proximity between the basic innovation and its application, the higher the probability of in-
fringement. More speciﬁcally we denote by x the probability a Court considers there is patent
infringement. The upstream innovator does not observe x and has only prior beliefs on x given
by the uniform distribution on the interval [x,x]. The dispersion as well as the average of the
distribution depend on the range of claims of the patent. If the upstream innovator decides to
sue ﬁrm E for infringement in case of disagreement on the licence contract, both ﬁrms incur a
cost C. When the court considers the application actually infringes on the patent, ﬁrm I has the
opportunity to renegotiate the licence contract. Otherwise there is no licence and ﬁrms compete
on the market for applications. Whenever both ﬁrms compete without any licence agreement,
the proﬁts earned are thus πd(γ) and πd(γ). In a general framework, the probability x would
depend on the diﬀerent technical characteristics of the application of ﬁrm E. Therefore x should
be positively correlated with parameter γ. We consider here ﬁrst that the interval is independent
from the parameter γ so that ﬁrm I cannot infer the expected probability of infringement from
the observation of γ. At the end of the paper we discuss the case where parameter γ provides
information on the distribution of x.
We denote the total welfare with one application by WS, with two applications and a royalty
rate equal to r by WP(r) and ﬁnally with two applications that compete on the market without
any royalty rate by WC.W ea s s u m et h a tt o t a lw e l f a r ea r er a n k e da sf o l l o w s :WS <W P(r) ≤
WC because two applications improve total welfare with respect to one application only and
8because the royalty rate r introduces a distortion.
2.2 The game
We consider two diﬀerent conﬁgurations in terms of intellectual property rights for the basic
innovation. In the ﬁrst conﬁguration, the usefulness requirement of the patent oﬃce is soft and
thus the upstream innovation can be patented. In that case we say that a "broad patent" is
granted and the timing of the game is the following (see also ﬁgure 1):
1. The upstream innovator chooses its strategy regarding the basic innovation:
(i) The ﬁrm keeps the basic innovation secret.
(ii) The ﬁrm patents the basic innovation
(iii) The ﬁrm proposes to ﬁrm E to share the basic innovation at a cost F (research
cooperation).
2. If ﬁrm E refuses the access price F, ﬁrm I can patent the basic innovation.
3. If the innovation is patented, ﬁrm I proposes a licence contract (P,r)
4. If ﬁrm E refuses the licence contract, ﬁr m sg ot ot r i a l 1
5. Both ﬁrms compete on the market for applications.
In the second conﬁguration, the patent oﬃce requires direct application for an innovation to
be patented and thus the basic innovation cannot be patented. Here the timing of the game is
the same as before without the patent solution.
Moreover, ﬁrm E observes the probability x when ﬁrm I patents the innovation.
Our main objective is to determine the eﬀect of the patent for the basic innovation on
the choice between the secret and research cooperation. For that purpose, we study ﬁrst the
benchmark case where the basic innovation cannot be patented. Then, we introduce a patent
for the basic innovation so as to point-out its role on the incentive of the upstream innovator to
share knowledge through the cooperative solution.
3 Research cooperation versus secret without patent
In the absence of patent for the basic innovation, ﬁrm I can either keep the basic innovation
secret or propose research cooperation to ﬁrm E.
The strategy adopted by the upstream innovator is summarized in the following proposition.
1We consider that if ﬁrm E refuses the licence contract, ﬁrm I decides to go to trial. We show that this is
actually the case a far as C is not too high.
9Proposition 1 In the absence of patent for the basic innovation, there exists a threshold γnp(δ)
such that the upstream innovator chooses to keep the basic innovation secret as long as γ>γ np(δ)
and cooperate with ﬁrm E otherwise.
In order to understand the choice between cooperation and secrecy, we should determine the
proﬁt earned by the upstream innovator in both conﬁgurations.
If ﬁrm I decides to cooperate with ﬁrm E,b o t hﬁrms compete on the market for applications.
Moreover, because of the absence of patent to exclude ﬁrm E from the use of the basic innovation,
ﬁrm E accepts to pay at most (1−δ)πd(γ) to cooperate. Otherwise, ﬁrm E would prefer to try
to develop the application by itself. The proﬁto fﬁrm I is then (1 − δ)πd(γ)+δπm(γ).
The secret ensures a monopoly proﬁt but ﬁrm I does beneﬁt from the proﬁt of the other
potential application.
Clearly, the higher the competition, the lower the proﬁte a r n e di nc a s eo fr e s e a r c hc o o p e r a t i o n
because of a lower duopoly proﬁt. Hence the critical level of competition γnp(δ) above which the
ﬁrm prefers the secret. We should note that high probabilities for ﬁrm E to develop the basic
innovation alone reduce the price ﬁrm I can impose to the downstream ﬁrm to cooperate. This
is why the threshold of parameter γ depends on δ.
This result should be considered as the benchmark case where the absence of patent leads
the innovator to use the secret as long as competition is high enough. This conﬁguration is the
starting point to study to what extent the patent is likely to aﬀect the incentives to share the
basic innovation with ﬁrm E.
4 Research cooperation or patent?
We consider now that a patent protection is available for the basic innovation. We aim at
determining whether the upstream innovator will actually patent the basic innovation, keep it
secret or propose cooperation to the other ﬁrm.
We assess ﬁrst the expected proﬁt following the patenting of the basic innovation. Then we
determine the proﬁts induced by research cooperation so as to determine the optimal strategy.
4.1 Patent, litigation cost and optimal licensing
The patent does not guarantee a licence revenue for ﬁrm I since ﬁrm E can claim that its own
application does not infringe on the patent and thus can refuse the licence contract. Moreover,
10since the patent holder does not observe the full characteristics of the application, ﬁrm I is
unable to perfectly know the probability with which a court will consider that the application
of ﬁrm E actually infringes the patent.
We investigate the optimal licence contract proposed by ﬁrm I to ﬁrm E. Because of in-
formation asymmetry regarding the probability of infringement, the licence contract proposed
by ﬁrm I plays as a screening device. The following lemma provides the diﬀerent outcomes
following the basic innovation patenting and the optimal licence contract proposed by ﬁrm I.
Lemma 1 At the equilibrium, there exists a threshold b x(γ) such that the licence contract pro-
posed by ﬁrm I is accepted by ﬁrm E iﬀ its type x is larger than b x(γ). Moreover, the threshold
b x(γ) decreases with γ and there exists a value of γ above which b x(γ)=x.
We show in this lemma that whenever ﬁrm E has a probability to win a trial for infringement
high enough (higher than the threshold b x(γ)), she refuses the licence contract and both ﬁrms





surprisingly, the information asymmetry on the probability of infringement induces potential
conﬂict between both ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, we show in that lemma that the risk of conﬂict
depends dramatically on the level of competition on the market for applications. Tough compe-
tition reduces the risk of litigation. Let us disentangle the impact of asymmetric information on
the licence contract proposed by ﬁrm I and the reason why a high level of competition induces
ﬁrm E to accept the licence contract.
In the absence of any informational asymmetry, both ﬁrms can avoid costly litigation by
designing the licence contract accordingly. The royalty rate is set at r∗ to maximize the joint
proﬁta n dt h eﬁxed fee allows the ﬁrms to divide (πI(r∗,γ)+πE(r∗,γ)=Π(γ)) in order to avoid
litigation. Thus, the level of the ﬁxed part would depend mainly on the probability of success of
ﬁrm E in case of trial. In other words, both ﬁrms would avoid litigation costs and would share
the monopoly proﬁt, Π(γ), according to the probability of dependence x.
Asymmetric information on the parameter x prevents to implement such a strategy and
aﬀects the proﬁt sharing as well as the rate of dispute between both ﬁrms.
The licence contract still consists of a royalty rate that allows the maximization of the
joint proﬁts. Yet, information asymmetry modiﬁes the level of the ﬁxed part. Firm I faces the
following trade-oﬀ in setting the ﬁxed fee, P.I ft h eﬁrm increases P, it leads to a higher litigation
rate but also rises the licence revenue while a lower ﬁxed fee reduces the licence revenue but
decreases the risk of litigation. The optimal level of P depends on the choice of ﬁrm E. The
11refusal of the licence contract allows the ﬁrm not to pay a licence fee with probability x which
is private value. Nevertheless, the refusal involves also two diﬀerent costs: the ﬁrm incurs the
litigation cost and the level of competition results higher because of the absence of the softening
eﬀect of the royalty rate. Hence the higher the competitive pressure on the market, the higher
the cost to refuse the license contract and therefore the higher the incentive to accept this licence
contract. This is the reason why the rate of approval of the licence contract increases with the
competitive toughness γ. We show that if the level of competition is high enough, the licence
contract is always accepted and thus the ﬁrms never go to trial.
Once the optimal level of the licence contract is determined, we can deduce the expected
proﬁto fb o t hﬁrms. We denote by ΠE,b(γ,C) the proﬁte a r n e db yﬁrm E and by ΠI,b(γ,C) the
proﬁto fﬁrm I. The following lemma provides both proﬁts.
Lemma 2 If ﬁrm I patents the basic innovation, the whole expected proﬁto fb o t hﬁrms is equal
to: ΠE,b(γ,C)+ΠI,b(γ,C)=Π(γ) − (1 − Q(γ))(Π(γ) − 2πd(γ)) − (1 − q(γ))2C
where Q(γ) is the probability ﬁrm E pays a licence to ﬁrm I.
We stress that both ﬁrms fail to share the maximized joint proﬁt Π(γ) whenever there is a
positive probability of conﬂict. This result will turn-out to be crucial in the trade-oﬀ between
patent and cooperation.
We capture in this lemma the ineﬃciency of the patent. In lemma 1, we showed that both
ﬁrms cannot avoid costly litigation and in case of litigation, the ineﬃciency is twofold. First,
both ﬁrms earn the duopoly proﬁt rather than Π(γ) whenever there is no licensing. Hence the
term (Π(γ) − 2πd(γ)). Second, ﬁrms incur litigation costs captured by the term (1 − q(γ))2C.
The level of both ineﬃciencies depends critically on the probability with which ﬁrm E refuses
the licence contract (probability 1−q(γ)) as well as on the probability with which ﬁrm I looses the
trial. Overall, the probability Q(γ) gives the probability with which there is a licence contract.
It is the case as far as either ﬁrm E accepts the licence contract proposed by I or looses the
trial.
In lemma 1 we stressed that the probability of trial depends critically on the level of com-
petition. As a result, the lower the competition, the higher the probability the licence contract
is refused. Thus, if competition is tough on the market for applications, most of the time both
ﬁrms agree on a licence contract. The total proﬁti st h e ne q u a lt oΠ(γ) and the patent avoids
proﬁti n e ﬃciency. If competition is soft, an agreement would require a low ﬁxed part. Firm I
12prefers to keep the ﬁxed part at a level that could lead to trial. Hence a higher probability of
disagreement and thus possible proﬁti n e ﬃciency and litigation costs.
In other terms, soft competition compounds the impact of asymmetric information on the
innovation characteristics of ﬁrm E and by reducing the chance of agreement. Instead, the
toughness of competition lowers the patent ineﬃciencies.
In the next section, we turn to compare the expected beneﬁt of the two other research
strategies, namely the research cooperation and the secret, with the patent outcome.
4.2 Patent versus research cooperation
Firm I can decide to keep the innovation secret or to propose to ﬁrm E research cooperation
rather than to patent the basic innovation. The following proposition provides the optimal
choice.
Proposition 2 The choice between patent, research cooperation and secret gives rise to the
following decision rule:
There exists a threshold of the competition toughness γp such that for any γ>γ p, the ﬁrm
I patents the basic innovation while for any γ<γ p, both ﬁrms cooperate.
The choice of the best strategy for ﬁrm I is the result of a trade-oﬀ between the costs and
beneﬁts of each solution. Basically, research cooperation does not incur any litigation costs
but leads both ﬁrms to compete on the market for applications. If ﬁrm I patents the basic
innovation, litigation costs reduce the proﬁt but softens competition. The secrecy preserves the
monopoly proﬁt but ﬁrm E does not enter and thus ﬁrm I does not earn revenue from from
access to its basic innovation.
Let us explain the outcome of this trade-oﬀ.
First we should note that here the patent solution always dominates the secret. Consider
for instance a licence contract where ﬁrm E obtains the duopoly proﬁt. Firm E accepts such
a contract since in case of trial, the ﬁrm cannot obtain more than the duopoly proﬁt. The
proﬁte a r n e db yﬁrm I is thus equal to Π(γ) − πd(γ). We show that this contract ensures at
least the proﬁt under secrecy which is equal to the monopoly proﬁt for one application only
(πm(γ)). In other words, ﬁrm I always prefers patenting and licencing the basic innovation to
ﬁrm E rather than to keep it secret. In that sense the patent we consider in that model is a
powerful instrument to induce knowledge transfer. This result relies on two main assumptions.
13First, knowledge transfer gives rise to a second application that increases the value of the basic
innovation since the proﬁt Π(γ) is always higher than the monopoly proﬁtf o rt h ea p p l i c a t i o no f
ﬁrm I only (πm(γ)). Second, the unconstrained licence contract used by ﬁrm I allows the ﬁrm
to share the monopoly proﬁt Π(γ) between both ﬁrms.
Therefore, the choice for the ﬁrm I amounts to compare patenting with research cooperation
as the most proﬁtable choice to transfer knowledge. It worth stressing here that even though
the patent is a very proﬁtable instrument to transfer knowledge, according to proposition 2,
cooperation could be preferred by ﬁrm I.
This choice between research cooperation and patent gives rise to the following trade-oﬀ.
On the one hand, cooperation avoids any litigation cost. Nevertheless, since both ﬁrms have
access to the basic innovation, no licence contract is required to ﬁrm E and thus both ﬁrms
compete on the market. In addition to the duopoly proﬁt, ﬁrm I earns the price paid by ﬁrm
E. This price depends on the expected proﬁto fﬁrm E if the ﬁrm refuses to cooperate and
if afterwards ﬁrm I patents the basic innovation. On the other hand , the patent is likely to
constrain ﬁrm E to accept a licence contract in order to sell its own application. That licence
contract increases the proﬁto fﬁrm I through the licence revenue itself as well as through the
accommodating impact of the royalty rate on competition. Notwithstanding, if ﬁrm E refuses
the contract proposed, ﬁrm I incurs a litigation cost. Thus the comparison between the patent
and research cooperation amounts to compare the expected litigation cost that reduces the proﬁt
eﬃciency of the patent with the toughness of competition on the ﬁnal market that aﬀects the
proﬁt earned under cooperation.
In lemma 1, we stressed that the probability of litigation decreases with the competitive
pressure γ. Hence the threshold γp of the level of competition above which ﬁrm I prefers the
patent solution. In other words, a high level of competition deters research cooperation for two
main reasons. First, the patent avoids tough competition thanks to the royalty rate that softens
competition. Second, tough competition deters ﬁrm E to go to the trial and thus increases the
eﬃciency of the patent system by reducing the risk of litigation. It is important to note that
the level of competition does not matter only for the research cooperation proﬁt but also for the
patent solution proﬁt through the risk of litigation. Assume instead that the patent is free of
any litigation cost. In that case, because the joint proﬁt Π(γ) is always higher than the duopoly
proﬁt 2πd(γ), the patent would always dominate research cooperation even for very low level of
competition. Thus it is the presence of of litigation costs magniﬁed by soft competition that
lead the innovator to prefer research cooperation.
14In order to determine to what extent the introduction of the patent for the upstream inno-
vation undermines cooperation we must compare the thresholds γnp(δ) and γp.
It is easy to show that for δ =1 , we have γp >γ np(1) = 0. In that case, the patent does
not deter research cooperation. Rather, the patent promotes the knowledge transfer through
cooperation since for the range of γ equal to [0,γp], the patent allows research cooperation
whereas without patent ﬁrm I prefers the secrecy. Nevertheless, there exist lower values of δ
where γp is lower than γnp(δ) (see the appendix). In that case the patent deters cooperation as
the knowledge transfer solution.
Let us explain why the patent is likely to be preferred to the cooperative solution for low
values of δ and why the patent is likely to support the cooperative solution for higher values of
δ.
Consider ﬁrst the case where the parameter δ is high. The introduction of the patent increases
the expected proﬁto fﬁrm I whenever ﬁrm E refuses to cooperate. This higher proﬁt is due
to a better protection of the basic innovation with patenting that allows ﬁrm I to capture a
higher share of the proﬁto fﬁrm E. Therefore, when ﬁrm I negotiates the access price in case of
cooperation, the patent is a threat that increases its bargaining power. Thus the patent allows
ﬁrm I to increase the price of cooperation. Nevertheless the patent involves a risk of litigation
that is costly for ﬁrm I.A sar e s u l tt h eﬁrm uses the patent as a bargaining instrument but in
the end can prefer cooperation in order to avoid any litigation cost. This is the reason why the
introduction of the patent is likely to promote the cooperative solution as far as litigation costs
remain high.
If ﬁrm E has a low probability to innovate if it refuses to cooperate, the bargaining power
of ﬁrm I is high even without patent. It is the case whenever δ is low. Here, the cooperation
prevails against the secrecy without the patent even for high level of competition. For such high
levels of competition, the litigation rate is low so that the patent solution increases the proﬁt
with respect to the cooperation. The patent deters cooperation as a result.
The eﬀect of the introduction of the patent on the welfare is ambiguous as well, at least for
low values of δ. Whenever the cooperative solution is adopted without the patent and is replaced
by the patent, there is a welfare loss since W(r) <W c. Nevertheless, the patent also increases
the welfare by both avoiding the secret and promoting the cooperative solution for high values of
δ. Yet, it worth noting that for high values of δ, the introduction of the patent is always welfare
improving since in that case the patent always supports cooperation.
15Our model allows to study the role of litigation costs on the actual litigation rate as well
as on the trade-oﬀ between patent and research cooperation. An increase in the litigation cost
reduces the litigation rate. A higher C induces both ﬁrms to avoid litigation. Nevertheless the
impact on the cooperative solution is ambiguous. Indeed, research cooperation is enhanced by
high expected litigation costs and the impact of a higher C on total litigation costs is unclear
since an increase in C rises the cost in case of trial but also lowers the probability to go to trial.
If we follow our open licence interpretation of cooperation, according to proposition 2, our
predictions are twofold. First, the downstream innovator uses the open licence solution to
avoid litigation costs. Moreover, the upstream innovator grants such a licence for downstream
innovations that are suﬃciently diﬀerent from its own application only. Otherwise ﬁrm I prefers
the patent solution.
At the equilibrium, the litigation rate depends directly on the expected probability for ﬁrm
I to win the trial. We examine in the following proposition the impact of both a change in the
average probability as well as in the dispersion of probabilities on the litigation rate q(γ).
Proposition 3 At the equilibrium, the litigation rate increases with both the average and the
dispersion of the distribution of the probability (x) for the patent to be infringed by the competitor
(ﬁrm E).
We argue that an increase in both the average probability for ﬁrm I to win the trial as well
as a higher dispersion induce more litigation. Indeed, both changes in the distribution of the
probability x lead to higher levels of the probability to win the trial. Firm I takes advantage of
such higher probabilities to set a higher licence fee that leads to a higher litigation rate.
We can interpret a higher average probability as a broader patent in terms of range of claims.
In that case, a broader patent promotes the cooperative solution since a broader patent increases
the litigation cost and thus induces the ﬁrm to choose the cooperation.
This proposition also allows to study the case where the observed characteristics of the
application of ﬁrm E captured by the parameter γ, provides information on the probability x.
We consider the following relationship between the interval of x and the parameter γ. First,
we assume that the closer both applications, the higher the average probability for ﬁrm I to
win the trial because of dependence. Second, regarding the dispersion of the probability, we can
consider an inverted-U shape relationship so that for very close or for very diﬀerent applications,
the dispersion of probabilities is low whereas for an intermediate value of the parameter γ, the
dispersion is higher. We can determine to what extent this type of correlation between the
16characteristic of the application and the probability of dependence modiﬁes the trade-oﬀ between
the patent and the cooperative solution.
If we start with very close applications, the high level of competition leads both ﬁrms to
avoid litigation in case of patent. Thus, despite the high average probability of dependence that
is likely to increase the litigation rate, the patent solution dominates.
If we focus on intermediate values of γ and more particularly on the threshold γp, two eﬀects
go in opposite directions. The higher level of dispersion due to the intermediate value of γ
tends to increases litigation and thus favors the cooperative solution. Nevertheless the lower
probability of dependence is likely to reduce litigation. As a result, it is unclear whether the
threshold is positively or negatively aﬀected by the information provided by the correlation
between γ and the distribution of x.
If we consider very diﬀerent applications, the very low level of competition leads to a high
litigation rate despite the low dispersion of the dependence probability. The optimal choice
remains cooperation, as a result.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We develop in this paper a framework to analyze the choice between secrecy, intellectual property
right and cooperation. We consider a ﬁrm that can use of a basic innovation to develop an
application. The basic innovation can also leads another ﬁrm to develop a diﬀerent application.
We ﬁrst determine the incentives for the basic innovator to either cooperate with the competitor
to give him access to the basic innovation or to keep the basic innovation secret. Then, we
contrast the emergence of cooperation with and without patent for the basic innovation. We
stress the dramatic role played by the patent by showing that cooperation emerges if the company
that owns the basic innovation has the option to protect it by an intellectual property right. In
that sense, we argue that intellectual property rights could be crucial to promote cooperation.
More precisely, we show that without patent, secrecy tends to dominate cooperation whereas
the introduction of the patent promotes cooperation as long as competition on the market for
applications remains soft and the strength of the patent is low enough.
In terms of intellectual property right public policy, we conclude that if a country does not
make patentable the basic innovation, such a decision could be harmful to cooperation and
thereby to expected social welfare by triggering secrecy. Nevertheless, a too strong intellec-
tual property right -high probability of wining counterfeit lawsuit - could also be harmful to
17cooperation.
6A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1
Firm I proposes a price F to cooperate. If E accepts, its proﬁti se q u a lt oπd(0,δ)−F. If E
does not accept its expected proﬁti sδπd(γ).
Thus ﬁrm I can require a price F =( 1− δ)πd(0,δ).
Under the secret, ﬁrm I earns πm(γ). Hence the threshold γnp(δ) is the solution of πm(γ)=
(2 − δ)πd(γ).
Proof of lemma 1 and lemma 2
1. We determine ﬁrst the licence contract proposed by ﬁrm I at the equilibrium.
Firm I proposes a contract (r,P) to E
(i) Behaviour of ﬁrm E of type x
Firm E accepts the licence (r,P) iﬀ x>b x with b x is the probability that leads ﬁrm E to
indiﬀrent between accepting the licence and refusing it. We have b x such that:
πE,d(r,γ) − P =( 1 − b x)πd(γ) − C
iff b x(P,r)=
πd(γ)+P − C − πE,d(r,γ)
πd(γ)
For extreme values of P, we have:
b x(P,r)=x iﬀ P<P= Max(0,πE,d(r,γ) − (1 − x)πd(γ)+C)
b x(P,r)=x iﬀ P>M a x (0,πE,d(r,γ) − (1 − x)πd(γ)+C)=P
(ii) Determination of the optimal licence contract (P,r)
First, ﬁrm I determines the royalty rate r.
We ﬁrst show that ﬁrm I sets the royalty r at a level that maximizes the total proﬁto fb o t h
ﬁrms given by πI,d(r,γ)+πE,d(r,γ). Let us denote by r∗ such a royalty.
Indeed, consider instead a contract (r,P) with r 6= r∗.
We can ﬁnd P0 such that:
πE,d(r∗,γ) − P0 = πE,d(r,γ) − P a n ds u c ht h a tπI,d(r∗,γ)+P0 >π I,d(r,γ)+P
s i n c ew eh a v e :
πI,d(r∗,γ)+P0 = πI,d(r∗,γ)+πE,d(r∗,γ)−πE,d(r,γ)+P>π I,d(r,γ)+πE,d(r,γ)−πE,d(r,γ)+
P
18Thus without aﬀecting the gain of ﬁrm E, the royalty r∗ is better than any level r.
We denote by Π(γ)=πI,d(r∗,γ)+πE,d(r∗,γ).
Second, ﬁrm I determines P that maximizes the expected gain.
If E accepts the licence (x>b x),Iearns πI,d(r,γ)+P
If E refuses (x<b x),Iearns (1 − x)πd + xΠ(γ) − C
Thus the expected proﬁto fﬁrm I is equal to:






x xf(x)(Π(γ) − πd(γ))
i
+ πd(γ) − C
The derivative of the expected proﬁtw i t hr e s p e c tt oP gives:
[1 − F(b x(P))] − f(b x(P))b x0(P)
h
−b x(Π(γ) − πd(γ)) + πI,d(r∗,γ)+P − πd(γ)+C
i
If we replace P b yi t se x p r e s s i o n ,w eh a v ea l s o :
[1 − F(b x)] − f(b x)
∙











[x − b x] −
∙







Let us study this derivative with respect to b x.
We can deﬁne: G(γ,b x)=
h





and H(b x)=x − b x.
We have H0(b x)=−1 and
∂G(γ,e x)
∂e x = −
Π(γ)−2πd(γ)
πd(γ)
Therefore, we have H0(b x) >
∂G(γ,e x)
∂e x iﬀ Π(γ) > 3πd(γ) iﬀ γ>e γ.








Therefore, if γ>e γ, the derivative is always negative (it is increasing and negative for x = x)
so that b x = x.
For γ<e γ, we have H0(b x) <
∂G(γ,e x)
∂e x which makes possible an interior solution.
In that case we must evaluate H(x) − G(γ,x).
We have H(x) − G(γ,x)= 1
x−x
³








If γ =0 , we have H(x) − G(γ,x)= 1
x−x
³





and thus for C low enough the
diﬀerence is positive. Therefore, there exists an optimal b x that equalizes the derivative to 0
(H(b x) − G(γ,b x)=0 )w i t hx < b x<x.
Let us study the impact of γ on the optimal solution b x.
19F o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n( x < b x<x), we have b x uniquely deﬁned by H(b x) − G(γ,b x)=0 .











∂γ > 0 and ∂G
∂e x − ∂H
∂e x > 0
As a result, the optimal solution b x(γ) decreases with γ.
We deduce that there exits a unique threshold of γ above which b x(γ)=x and below which
x>b x(γ) >x .
By assumption, we consider that ﬁrm I always decides to go to trial. It is proﬁtable as long
as the expected proﬁt is positive which is the case if: ∙U e x(P)
x xf(x)
F Π(γ) − C
¸
≥ πd(γ). If C is low enough, the inequality holds.
2. Conclusion on payoﬀs and probability of litigation at the equilibrium
At the equilibrium, the expected proﬁtf o rb o t hﬁrms are the following:






f(x)dx +( 1− F(b x))
£
Π(γ) − (1 − b x)πd(γ)+C
¤
ﬁrm E : ΠE,b(C,γ)=
R e x
x (1 − x)πd(γ)f(x)dx +( 1− F(b x))
£
(1 − b x)πd(γ) − C
¤
We deduce the sum of both proﬁts:
ΠE,b(C,γ)+ΠI,b(C,γ)=Q(γ).Π(γ)+( 1− Q(γ))2πd(γ) − q(γ)2C
with Q(γ)=1− F(b x)+
R e x
x xf(x)dx. In other terms Q(γ) is the probability with which a
licence contract is implemented (after or before trial)
with q(γ)=1− F(b x), the probability of trial. This probability decreases with γ since b x
decreases with γ.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Patent against secrecy
The patent always dominates the secret. Indeed, if ﬁrm E refuses the licence contract, she
obtains at most πd(γ) − C. Therefore, if ﬁrm I leaves E with πd(γ) − C, it will always accept.
In that case the proﬁto fﬁrm I is Π(γ) − (πd(γ) − C). In other terms, the patent ensures at
least a proﬁte q u a lt oΠ(γ)−(πd(γ)−C). In case of secret, the proﬁti sπm(γ). We show in the
appendix dedicated to our example that Π(γ)=πm(γ)+πd(γ). Hence the domination of the
patent over the secret.
(ii) Comparison between patent and cooperation
If ﬁrm I proposes cooperation to ﬁrm E, the price proposed is equal to:
F = πd(γ) − ΠE,b(C,γ) and thus ﬁrm I obtains 2πd(γ) − ΠE,b(C,γ)
20As a result, cooperation is preferred as long as 2πd(γ) > ΠE,b(C,γ)+ΠI,b(C,γ)
We have: ΠE,b(C,γ)+ΠI,b(C,γ) − 2πd(γ)=Q(γ).(Π(γ) − 2πd(γ)) − q(γ)2C. We showed
that q(γ) decreases with γ and Q(γ) increases with γ. Moreover the diﬀerence Π(γ) − 2πd(γ)
increases with γ.
For extreme values of γ we have:
γ =0:we have Q(γ).(Π(γ)−2πd(γ))−q(γ)2C = −2q(γ)C<0: cooperation is thus preferred
γ = e γ : we have Q(γ).(Π(γ) − 2πd(γ)) = Q(γ)Π(γ) > 0:the patent is thus preferred
We deduce that there exists a unique threshold γp such that for any γ>γ p, the patent
solution is preferred and for any γ<γ p, the cooperation solution is preferred.
(iii) Comparison of both thresholds γp and γnp(δ).
The function γnp(δ) decreases with δ and for δ =0 , we have γnp(0) = 0 <γ p.
Let us show that we have in the Hotelling model γp <γ np(1).
We have γnp(1) such that πm(γ)=2 πd(γ). Moreover we have Π(γ) − πm(γ)=πd(γ).
Therefore for γ = γnp, we have also Π(γnp)=3 πd(γnp).
We showed in the proof of lemma 1 that if Π(γnp)=3 πd(γnp), we have b x(γ)=x. In other
terms there is no conﬂict and thus the patent solution is better than the cooperative solution
for ﬁrm I.
We deduce that γp <γ np(1).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
We start from the implicit expression of b x given by the following equation:
∙





= x − b x
(i) An increase in the average probability
x+x
2 leads to an increase in x. It leads to an increase
in b x and thus to a decrease in x − b x. It results a higher litigation rate since
e x−x
x−x increases.
(ii) An increase in the dispersion (x − x) with unchanged average probability.
It leads to an increase in leads to an increase in x and thus to a decrease in x− b x. Moreover
we have
e x−x
x−x + x−e x
x−x =1 . Since x−e x
x−x decreases, the litigation rate,
e x−x
x−x, increases.
A model of market competition between both applications
We consider a Hotelling diﬀerentiation framework where consumers are uniformly distrib-
uted on a segment [0,1] according to the density function 1. Application I is located in 0 and
application E is located in 1. We assume that both ﬁrms price discriminate between consumers.
If we denote by pj(y) the price of ﬁrm j (j = E,I) for a consumer located in y, this consumer
21earns a surplus equal to V −pj(y)−t|y − d| where t is a parameter that captures diﬀerentiation
between both applications (t>0) and d is the location of ﬁrm j (d =0for ﬁrm I and 1 for ﬁrm
E).
We determine: (1) the proﬁto fﬁrm I when she is the only ﬁrm on the market, (2) the
equilibrium when ﬁrm E pays a royalty rate r per unit and compete with ﬁrm I and (3) the
royalty rate that maximizes the joint proﬁt.
(1) Monopoly proﬁt πm(γ):
The optimal price is equal to: pI(y)=V − ty










(2) Competition with royalty rate
Since we consider that ﬁrms can perfectly price-discriminate, we also consider that the royalty
rate depends on the location of each consumer. We denote by r(y) such a rate for a consumer
located in y. Moreover, because of perfect price-discrimination, there is price competition be-




Let us determine the optimal response of ﬁrm I for a price pE(y)
if pE(y) ≤ V − t(1 − y):
The optimal response of I is equal to:
pE(y)−(2y − 1)t−ε if pE(y)−(2y − 1)t>r (y) and higher than pE(y)−(2y−1)t otherwise
where ε is as small as we want.
if pE(y) >V− t(1 − y),
The optimal response of I is equal to V − ty
If ﬁrm I sets a price pI(y), the optimal response of E is:
Max(pI(y)+( 2 y − 1)t;r(y)) if pI(y) <V− ty and Max(V − t(1 − y)t;r(y)) otherwise
Thus, the price-equilibrium for consumer y is:
pE(y)=r(y)+( 2 y − 1)t + ε and pI(y)=r(y) if r(y) ≤ V − ty
The total proﬁti se q u a lt o :r(y)+( 2 y − 1)t + ε
pE(y)=Max(V − t(1 − y);r(y)) if r(y) >V− ty and pI(y)=V − ty
The total proﬁti se q u a lt o :
V − (1 − y)t if r(y) <V− (1 − y)t
V − yt if r(y) >V− (1 − y)t
22(b) For y<1
2 :
Following the same reasoning, we have at the equilibrium:
pE(y)=r(y) and pI(y)=Min(r(y)+t(1 − 2y);V − ty)
The total proﬁti se q u a lt oMin(r(y)+t(1 − 2y);V − ty)
(3) The optimal royalty rate r(y) and the duopoly proﬁtf o rr(y)=0:




























As a result, we have always Π(γ) − πd(γ)=πm(γ)
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